WHY REVOLUTIONS FAIL: CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN CONFLICTS AS PERSONALISED STRUGGLES

*Tunde Agara PhD, *Onoho'Omhen Ebhohimhen PhD

Abstract

This paper examines Africa contemporary political conflicts and the employment of violence, threat, and force. All these create disequilibrium in the state and the breakdown of the political system and processes. It is contended that the lack of scientific, ideological underpinning may be implicated in the personalisation of the struggles. This absence of a universalizing philosophy to serve as guidance and justification of the struggles tend to rob them of the rallying or clarion call for grassroots support. Against the backdrop of the Marxist framework of analysis, it is plausible to argue that the struggles for political participation, access to resources, identity, and attachment to territory would be futile if devoid of a stirring ideological base. Thus, since most of Africa's struggles do not possess that universalistic character, they tend to become either mindless or unjustifiable, no matter how

*Tunde Agara PhD
Centre for Strategic and Development Studies, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma
*Onoho'Omhen Ebhohimhen PhD
Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Delta State

notable. In all, the paper advises that the litmus test of any contestation should emphasise building the necessary support base to resolve the central injustice, the purpose that actuated the struggle.

Keywords: Africa; conflict; ideology; revolution; violence

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary political processes and societies seem to be closely associated with the twin phenomena of force and violence. Briefly, political violence represents a peculiar form of conflict that creates disequilibrium in the state, a breakdown of its political system and processes. A revolution rarely tends not to be associated with the use of force or threat and violence. An exception to this rule tends to be cited in the example of the 'velvet revolution' in Czechoslovakia of 1989. Notwithstanding its recency in the literature of revolutions to have merited robust interrogation, it also seems complicated to hold that Czechoslovakia's event was a revolutionary or comprehensive reorganisation of the society. Instead, it is safe to hold that it juxtaposes the self-sacrificing commitment of historical revolutionary action against the public choice approach to social change. This situational theoretic context has been illustrated in Taylor (1988, pp. 85-86) to the effect that "the public choice approach excludes action taken where the pleasure of the act itself gives important benefits, instead of them being limited to the consequences of the action." In other words, velvet revolutions could be compared to acts by "political entrepreneurs, people who, for their career reason, find it in their private interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant" (Hardin, 1982, p. 35) constituencies instead of united action for the comprehensive reordering of society.

In the binary framework, therefore, the former, violence, use, and threat could become a defining characteristic of a revolution that seduces some scholars to transfer the transient character of violence to the revolution itself (Hobsbawm, 2011). Individually and at different time scales, Yates (1962) and Skocpol (1979) postulations through the agency of frustration, aggression, and conflict fall within the latter construct with the persuasive tendency towards reforms.

Like all Social Science concepts, what a revolution means could vary, nay, contentious that it is better to understand it through its historical evolution. Neumann (1949) and Griewank (1971) have explicated that the idea of a 'revolution' entered into the Political Science lexicon from astronomy, where it is used to show the oscillation of a planetary body around another and later return to the starting point. Predictably, this conservative usage of the term became popular amongst early political scientists who were the first to adopt the term (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968, p. 4) to mean a reactionary return to a starting point implication, to a pre-ordained order. Neumann specifically pointed out that the term took a new meaning in the 18th century when the term 'revolutionary' implied an individual whose actions can alter the course of history. In this regard, a radical conception of revolution as renovation and transformation in the "basic principles of good government" by Machiavelli became popular (Griewank, 1971, p. 20).

However, Marx (1975) and Lenin (1977 [1917]) refined the term, giving it a scientific dimension when Marx explicitly stated that

> the next French Revolution will no longer attempt to transfer the bureaucratic-military apparatus from one hand to another but to smash it, and this is the precondition for every people's revolution… (1975, p. 247).

Durotoye's (1989, p. 20) commentary on the Marxian postulation is that "a revolution takes place when a socio-economic formation is smashed and replaced by another which represents an advancement of society to a higher level of social development." The imperative to replace the smashed socio-economic formation with a new one distinguishes a revolution from anarchy. Although the charge of nihilism may arise primarily because of this insistence to smash and destroy the existing system, it is the same insistence that distinguished a revolution from a reform. Consequently, on the one hand, a reform is "a change or development that takes place within the same socio-economic formation" (Majola, 1988, p. 100). On the other hand, a revolution is a sweeping, fundamental change in the political organisation and social structure, economic property control, and the social order's predominant myth(Neumann, 1949). In most historical

instances, the systemic change was accompanied by force to push aside the decadent order or to overcome the resistance arrayed against the revolution. Thus, the force could be resultant and violence either a consequence or precursor of the outmoded order's resistance to yield peacefully to the proposed change.

THE NOTION OF IDEOLOGY IN MARXIAN CONCEPTION OF A REVOLUTION

The literature is replete with the liberal conception of ideology. For instance, Bell (1960, p. 370) has argued that ideology is "the conversion of ideas into social levers." It "simplifies ideas, establishes a claim to truth, and, in the union of the two, demands a commitment to action" (p. 372). According to Apter (1964, p. 16), ideology acts as the linchpin that "links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings and, by doing so, lends a more honorable and dignified complexion to social conduct." Some other liberal scholars have tended to see ideology as a somewhat loosely organised folk philosophy encompassing the totality of ideals and aspirations of a people (Ingersoll & Matthew, 1991, p. 4).

Thus, the term ideology can be applied in two ways; first, as a set of ideas, which is accepted to be true by a particular group of people or nation or society without further examination or inquiry as to their validity. Second, the science of ideas examines how different ideas are formed, how truth is distorted, and how we can overcome this distortion to the truth. Ideology as a set of ideas is propounded to justify or denounce a particular or an accepted way of life and belief of a social, economic, or political organisation. Viewed this way, ideology becomes a matter of faith with no scientific basis and not subject to any verification. According to its tenets and principles, its adherents are satisfied to accept it and order their way of life while others may disagree and attempt to prove its falsehood.

Consequently, ideology leads to the development of a love-hate relationship. As Bell (1960, p. 371) had equally noted, what gives ideology its force is its passion. Ideology taps emotion fuses its energies, and channels them into politics. This passion is then channeled into politics or political issues, and hence its connection with revolution becomes instead natural.

It may help iterate the point here that there are three generally acceptable or possible Marxism approaches. The first is Marxism in the form of the study and applying an analytical method or what is prevalent in literature as the Marxian methodology. The second is to employ Marxism as a theory of development. The third is to find in it a possible guide to action in political practice. Central to these three approaches, particularly related to understanding the Marxian conception of revolution, is the cardinal role of ideology in energising and paving the way to a successful revolution.

Karl Marx, in many of his writings, espoused his perception of ideology as he viewed ideology as a manifestation of false consciousness (1968; 1977[1859]). He argued that in social development, people's material needs advance faster than their social consciousness. This leads to distortion of consciousness hence false consciousness, and this is reflected in their ideology. It follows that in every society, the dominant class uses ideology to maintain and perpetuate its authority on the rest of the classes in society. To be precise, ideology could serve as an instrument for protecting the interests of the dominant class. As a result, the bourgeoisie needs and uses ideology to maintain itself in power.

On the other end of the pole, the working class, the proletariat, As the proletariat strives to create a classless society that could be counterintuitive to the prevalent order, it finds ideology as a lever perpetuate power in the state that will ultimately wither away. Lenin contextually discourses ideology as not necessarily a distortion of truth to conceal the prevailing contradictions but has become a concept that refers to different classes' political consciousness, including the proletarian class. He argued that the class struggle might continue for a very long time. Therefore, the proletariat needs an ideology to maintain the struggle – the ideology of scientific socialism for guidance lest they are overpowered by bourgeois ideology.

Georg Lukacs, the Hungarian Marxist scholar, later expressed analogous views in his seminal work that consciousness was always class consciousness (Lukacs, 1972[1909]). Ideology refers to both bourgeois and proletarian consciousness without necessarily implying any negative connotation. He argued that Marxism is the ideology of the proletariat. Bourgeois

ideology is false not because ideology itself is false consciousness but because the capitalist class cannot stand on its own but must exploit the proletariat to maintain and perpetuate itself. He submits that bourgeois ideology is deplorable because it dominates and contaminates the psychological consciousness of the proletariat.

Karl Mannheim, a German Sociologist, rejects the Marxist conception of ideology on three grounds. The first is that there is no direct relationship between what he called the "style of thought" of any group to its interests. Precisely, therefore, there is no direct correlation between a group's consciousness and its economic interests. The second area of disagreement is that social backgrounds shape all thoughts. For this reason, Marxism itself is an ideology of a class. Finally, he argued that it was not only classed that shaped or influence consciousness; that other social groups, like different generations, also have a significant influence on consciousness. Based on this submission, Mannheim argued that false consciousness could be manifested in two forms: ideology and utopia. According to him, ideology represents the tendency of conservation (Mannheim, 1936).

We can deduce from the Mannheim thesis that while ideology relies on false consciousness to muster support for maintaining the status quo, utopia represents the impetus for change. Utopia could be equally said to rely on false consciousness by projecting unrealisable principles to muster support for change forces. As a result, while a ruling class may use ideology to maintain its rule, the opposition projects a utopia to change the ideology. In the end, Mannheim submits that the Marxist vision of a classless society was utopian and uses false consciousness to achieve this vision. This was elaborately distilled in his construct of ideology as tantamount to utopia.

Nevertheless, we cannot lose sight of ideologies as basically performing at least three less essential functions. The first is that they amplify, clarify or enlarge our view of the world and the events that take place in it. Second, they instigate action either for or against a proposed course of change. Third, they attempt to justify a course of action taken by an individual or a group of individuals or by the government. Therefore, political ideologies bother the state's administration or the institutions of a specific form of

political order. A political idea seeks to understand the state, the source of its power, and the location of and power relations within the state. In essence, the state is organised around specific political ideologies. There are so many, which prompted Kramnick and Walkins (Kramnick & Walkins, 1979) to call this millennium the Age of Ideology. However, for an ideology to be compelling or persuasive, it need not meet the measurement of rationality or the logic of consistency.

However, like a religion that often serves as the basis for an ideology, it has the power to facilitate the reconciliation of the individual with his act or with those acts which he desires or supports. For that reason, for an ideology to be influential, it must reconcile and act as the basis for justifying actions and policies made on its behalf. Accordingly, for the revolutionaries, an ideology provides the basis for actions and at the same time justifies the violent overthrow of legitimacy. Ideology supplies the revolutionaries the needed justification for their actions, the 'why' and 'ought' for revolutionary action. In the final analysis, ideology, therefore, becomes a mass of doctrine that enables various men to espouse a simple cause and reduce their apprehensions for jeopardising an old regime's stability.

CONCEPTUALISING REVOLUTIONS

There is no dearth of attempts to conceptualise or define a revolution. Johnson (1964, p. 10) has defined it as "the acceptance of violence in order to bring about change." Similarly, Black (1964, p. 4) equally views revolutions as "the wide range of circumstances – from mere threats of force to major civil wars – in which illegitimate violence is employed within a country to effect political change." Meyer (1966, p. 275) has couched his definition in three distinct processes: the destruction of an *ancien regime,* a period of chaotic disorder, and creating a new order or political system. The commonality in these definitions is that revolution has been seen as resulting in change, induced through violence or threat of violence and force.
Amman (1962) adopted the realist perspective by emphasising a power relationship of a revolution as a breakdown, momentarily or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the

habit of obedience….a revolution prevails when the state's monopoly of power is effectively challenged and persists until a monopoly of power is re-established (pp. 36-53).

Since change and power have become synonymous with and a common denominator of a revolution, Gross (1958, pp. xx-xxi) had to distinguish between two kinds of forced change in government; the transfer of power from "above" constituting a coup, and the fundamental social changes carried out from "below" that constitute a social revolution.
To simplify this much-debated concept, Johnson (1964, pp. 27-28) offered a revolution typology using four criteria to distinguish between types. One, the targets of revolution, whether the regime, the form of government or the community; two, the identity of the revolutionaries, whether they are elite, masses or masses led by the elite; three, goals or ideology; and four, timing, whether spontaneous or calculated. Based on these, he identified six types of revolution. First is the Jacquerie (the mass peasant uprising); second, the Millenarian rebellion (the Jacquerie plus charismatic leadership) and third, the Anarchistic rebellion (the attempt to restore an already shattered society as in the Vendee rebellion, 1793-1796). The fourth is the Jacobin-Communist revolution (spontaneous social revolution as in France or Russia); the fifth, the conspiratorial coup d'état; and the sixth, the militarised mass insurrection (calculated nationalist and social revolution utilising guerrilla warfare as in China 1937-1949, Algeria 1954-1962, and North Vietnam 1945-1954).

Some held and have argued that a revolution is more than violent conflicts but that it also entails deep-seated and permanent "change in social attitudes and values basic to the traditional institutional order" (Yoder, 1926, p. 441). Equally, Hopper (1950, p. 271) thinks that a revolution must bring about "that kind of social change which occurs when the basic institutional (i.e., legally enforced) values of social order are rejected, and new values accepted." On our part, we shall adopt Calvert's (1967, p. 1) simple but the concise definition that revolutions are "forcible interventions, either to replace governments or to change the processes of government by smashing the former and replacing it with a qualitatively better one."

Thus, a revolution involves a total change in structure and the value systems and ideas (ideology). A new social structure implies the jettisoning of the old order and ideas on which it was built and adopting a qualitatively better set of ideas on which a new system will be built. The main argument of this paper is that, assessed against Marxian principles and guidelines for a revolution, there is an imperative for the emergence of a qualitative set of ideas (ideology) upon which a revolution is built, assessed and which forms the bedrock on which the revolution is based and will be assessed.

IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION: THE NEXUS

Following the success of every revolution or political upheaval, the first and perhaps the most urgent act of the revolutionaries or even military coup plotters is to reassure the citizens and foreign governments that the violence has ended, that normalcy has been restored, and the people are solidly behind and in support of the new government. These assurances, whether candid or not, formed the ideological basis of the revolutionaries. All revolutionaries find it imperative, necessary to defend and justify their actions, and it is in doing this that the nexus between the revolution and ideology is found. As Lenin argued, "there can be no revolutionary action without a revolutionary theory" (Carr, 1964, p. 149).

It is doubtful whether a revolution can genuinely occur and succeed without the accompanying guidance and justification which ideology provides. The guidance provides the revolution with plans, philosophies, martyrology, and doctrine essential and compatible with the functionaries. At the same time, every revolution also needs a plethora of justifications, which ideology equally provides. Whatever had been done had to be done not in the interest of the functionaries but of those of the people. The outcome is that the revolutionaries tend to emphasise modest contributions, their reluctance to act but that the pressing demand to act in consonance with the ideology of progress and national destiny was irresistible. This, of course, is reminiscent of the seeming reluctance to act and take up the responsibility of managing the Nigerian state as expressed by successful coup plotters in Nigeria.

In modern times, both the French and the Russian revolutions have been the primary sources and inspiration for ideology. Detailed historical factors and events leading to the revolutions are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to stress that the actual events of each of these revolutions were merely the storm centres of several centuries of ideological wars. In France, the revolution was never fully completed, nor did the functionaries fully agree on its principles. Thus, there arose the constant need to explain and justify the course of events to a populace that was both fragmented and frightened by the course of events. The great and perhaps the only particular ideological document, which the French Revolution bequeathed on the world, was the Declaration of the Rights of Man. As Postgate (1920, p. 13) noted, the document contained "scarcely a phrase which was not a revolutionary challenge, yet the document was adopted with practical unanimity [and] with little delay, it became a dangerous revolutionary instrument throughout much of the world" (Leiden and Schmitt 1968, p. 102). The Declaration became the most powerful ideological instrument to emerge because the functionaries needed to justify to themselves and the world the correctness of what they were doing, that is, the revolution they were making.

In Russia, the revolution was not a spontaneous action. Instead, there had been an undercurrent of revolutionary fervor. Writings and speeches by Bakunin, Plekhanov, Lenin, and Trotsky implied an undercurrent of revolutionary fervour and its continuity. Indeed, before the actual Russian Revolution of 1917, the revolutionaries had generated enough theory to justify virtually any kind of revolution. However, the Russian Revolution drew heavily from the doctrines and plan of action bequeathed to the world by Marx and Engels' writings.

Apart from these two, the world has not lacked a dearth of ideas that confirmed men's actions or inactions. The mass killings of the Jews by Germans during the Second World War benefitted from a lot of pseudo-philosophical and pseudo-science literature that captured the underlying justification of such genocidal and heinous actions. The Chinese revolution orchestrated by Mao Tse-tung has become attractive to most global South nations as it provides an ideological blueprint for the successful application of revolution in agrarian societies.

Every political system produces ideology because every political change must be rationalised. In Nigeria, every coup has produced its justification by the functionaries for the coup even though some of these justifications did not measure up (Agara, 2008). However, where acceptable justification is not readily available, something must be concocted or devised. This is what Leiden and Schmitt (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968, p. 109) referred to as "make-shift ideology." We shall discuss this further in the next section.

THE IDEOLOGICAL POVERTY OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Africa, as a continent, is neither immune from conflicts nor new to the destabilising effects of conflicts. Disorder and conflict are so prevalent in the continent that it is best to categorise them into epoch for a more precise understanding and analysis. Thus, conflicts in Africa can be divided into two broad epochs. The first epoch is delineated as the period preceding and ending with the Cold War (1945-1989). Within this epoch, three variants of conflicts can be discerned. The first variant is the various anti-colonial conflicts and wars of national liberation. Most notable of these were the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the various national liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau.

The second variant was the anti-apartheid wars in South Africa, Namibia and against the racist regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). These were wars waged against foreign interests, in coalition with some white-minority elements within the state, against a system that subjected the majority black population to inhuman treatment and permanent social segregation. These wars were waged through the 1970s and, in Namibia, all through the 1980s until independence in 1990.

The third variant is the significant conflicts of the 1970s that were Cold War-related. The African nations acted as proxies and provided the battlegrounds for conflicts that were the East confronting the West. An excellent example of this was the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (1976-83), the Angolan civil war (1975-88) in which the East took side with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against the West-backed National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).

A discerning feature of these conflicts was that they were fought with ideological underpinning, which acted as both guidance and justification for the struggles. The ideology of the era was a mixture of Marxian revolutionary ideology and nationalist ideology. A solid ideological foundation gave the struggle a focus and acted as a rallying or clarion call for grassroots support for the struggle. Perhaps more than anything else, it legitimised the struggle, and therefore, the people were willing to offer necessary assistance to the revolutionaries. This accounted for the eventual success of these struggles.

The Marxian revolutionary ideology has always had the power of arousing men and retains the power of frightening others, or as proclaimed in the Manifesto, it is a haunting "spectre... [that frightened the bourgeois system] for its future by the evils to which it necessarily gives rise" (Marx & Engels, 1969 [February 1848], p. 14; 53). Although Marx's revolutionary thoughts and ideas are beyond this paper's purview, suffice it to be said that Marxian revolutionary ideology is considerably rich in doctrine for revolutionary guidance and justification. It contains a scientific theory of revolution for advanced as well as for underdeveloped societies. Its revolutionary prescription for seizing state power may start with the most straightforward guerrilla tactics and then move to enlist popular support to challenge the regime's armed forces militarily. The result is a civil war or a war of liberation.

On the other hand, nationalism provides for the revolutionary a psychologically shared and semi-articulated ideology based on actual or imagined grievances around which the discontented or aggrieved can rally themselves and others against "outsiders" who have exploited them. Nationalist ideology must target which it could focus all its revolutionary fervor on, be it a colonial power, an old regime, or a dominant foreign economic interest. Where a commonality of language or culture exists, nationalist ideology readily finds adherents. However, Sub-Saharan Africa examples have shown that nationalist ideology needs no linguistic commonality to aid its eruption. This was evinced by the national liberation struggles in the various multi-ethnic and multilingual societies. The objective of the liberation from foreign colonial domination or minority rule trumped the pre-existing ethnic consciousness and indeed produced a new lingo of the

struggle. Either way, it is usual to term revolutionaries for national libera-tion and the ideology underpinning their struggle as nationalists.

The second epoch of conflicts in Africa emerged from the post-Cold War period. The nature of conflict in this epoch is quite radically different. Ibeanu (2003) has identified three types of conflicts that pervaded the continent during this period. These are one, conflicts that arose due to the struggle for political participation or over political space; two, conflicts caused by the contest for access to resources; and three, conflicts caused by the struggle over identity. To this, Kahler (2002, p. 1) has added a fourth one: conflict caused "by persistent attachment to the territory." However, conflicts can result due to any combination of factors. The con-flicts in Rwanda, Uganda, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia give us concrete examples of conflicts that ensued due to the struggle for political partici-pation, relevance, and inclusion.

Groups or parties that feel marginalised or excluded from having access to political power or that feel excluded because of another group or party's hegemonic monopoly over the political machinery have no other option than to resort to armed conflicts either to drive home their point for politi-cal inclusion or to wrest power from the other party's hands. This is very common in Africa, where politics has become or assumed the character of a zero-sum game.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Niger Delta area of Nigeria represents conflict over access to resources or dis-tribution of resources. Conflicts emanating from the struggle for identity and citizenship are typified by the many ethnic-related extermination wars in countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and the Darfur region of Sudan. The salience of the identical factor as a source of conflict is further made prominent by the plural nature of many African states and the fact that massive mobilisation of identities serves as a veritable basis for contesting and sometimes retaining a hegemonic hold over political power.

Negative ethnic stereotypes become a political resource which the politi-cians are not slack to whip up in the bid to control state machinery. By

this, embers of negative ethnicity are ignited, leading to violent conflicts, sometimes assuming a genocidal proportion as in Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda and Burundi. Ethnic conflicts also ensued as a result of disagreement over communities' boundaries. Many intra-state conflicts assume this character. As Nnoli (2003, p. 3) noted, this type of communal conflict over territories assumes the proportion it does basically because:

> the communal group is one in which primary identity prevails. Membership of the group is not attained but ascribed. Within the communal group, the individual self is defined holistically. The totality of the individual's involvement in life is defined by the group. Examples of communal groups include family, ethnic, religious, or regional groups (2003, p. 3).

Unlike the first epoch's conflicts, a significant characteristic of conflicts of this second epoch in Africa is the lack of any definitive ideology that could provide the necessary guidance and justification for the struggle. This may be because these conflicts lack the essential ingredient of a revolutionary struggle: liberation or freedom and novelty, introducing a new order or way of doing things. As Arendt (1963, p. 27) also explicated, "only where this pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution." She was insistent that revolutions are more than successful insurrections and that not every coup qualifies to be called a revolution.
In the specific instance of South Sudan, the gains of liberation from sectarian and myopic religious nationalism have become trumped by the struggle for personal power between Reik Machar and Savir Kiir. As Douglas Johnson (2014) argued, "a complex series of events motivated by a mixture of political disappointment, personal ambition, and ethnic rivalry," (pp. 167, 169) fundamentally diverged from the vision of a new South Sudan in independence.

All this gives the mistaken impression that Africa is bound to violence where "men kill each other because they have been unable to communicate" (Ouologuem, 1983 [1968], p. 175). Instead, what holds Africa in

thraldom and needs to be exorcised is that political struggles have to be guided by ideology to change the historical fate of the Black person.

Table I:

States/Regions	Nature of Conflict	Present status
Angola	Twenty-seven years of civil war ended in 2002	Wholly or partly resolved
Congo	Five years of civil wars in which some over three million died. Ended in 2003	Wholly or partly resolved
Burundi	Civil war and sporadic fighting between ethnic militia that spills across borders in the Great Lakes region: Rwanda, Burundi, and Eastern Congo	On-going and unresolved
Congo-Brazzaville	Fighting between rebels and government forces continues despite a 2003 ceasefire agreement	On-going and unresolved
The Central African Republic	Internal political instability and violent border skirmishes over water and grazing rights	On-going and unresolved
Cote d'Ivoire	On-going clashes between the Army -held south and the rebel-held north	On-going and unresolved
Eritrea/Ethiopia	Clashes over the precise demarcation of the border between the two countries even despite a formal agreement in 2000	On-going, unresolved and sporadic
Liberia	Fourteen years of civil war ended in a shaky truce in 2003	Wholly or partly resolved
Sierra Leone	Ten years of civil war ended in 2002. U.N. troops maintain the tentative peace due to withdrawal at the end of 2004	Wholly or partly resolved
Somalia	Anarchic country controlled by feuding warlords. The central government is unable to exercise sway over the capital city, Mogadishu. Two slices of the country – Somaliland and Puntland have de facto seceded	On-going and unresolved
Sudan	Ruthless ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region leaving 1.5 million homeless, 50,000 dead, and 200,000 in refugee camps in neighboring Chad	On-going and unresolved
Uganda	A brutal campaign of abduction and murder by the mythical Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has forced as many as 1.8 million people from their homes	On-going and unresolved
Nigeria	The Niger Delta area and conflict over resource control and government developmental presence	On-going and unresolved
South Sudan	The independence from Sudan in July 2011 became short-lived with the implosion of the SPLM . This ruling political party initially led the struggle for independence and individuals fighting for power.	On-going and unresolved
Egypt	Spread of the tentacles of the 2011 Arab Spring to Egypt and cyclical convulsions occasioning the fall of Hosni Mubarak; succession by Mohamed Morsi and practically, a coup d'état by Abdel Fattah al Sisi, who got himself elected President	Partially resolved
Libya	The 2011 Arab Spring protests led to a civil war, then foreign military intervention, the ousting and killing of Muammar Gaddafi, the proliferation of armed groups, violence and instability, a renewed civil war in 2014, and current efforts at an international peace settlement.	On-going and unresolved

Source: Adapted from Adetula, V. A. O. (2005, pp. 372-373; Roberts, 2018); varied sources.

In totality, what these struggles have is, at best, what we have referred to as makeshift ideology, which in essence is merely a bucket of arguments that seemed to be acceptable but for the moment. As Leiden and Schmitt (1968, p. 110), however, explained, "makeshift ideology is the practical product of the chaotic nature [of the struggle and] come into being when ... leaders are ignorant of ideology or those to whom they direct their efforts are ignorant of the terms of in which they couch their appeals." Indeed, if it displaces a regime without providing effective succession, civil resistance can involuntarily contribute to social disorder. In context, the decentralised and ad hoc quality of the leadership of some of the movements in the Arab Spring hindered their performance, and, above all, outcomes depended heavily on the composition and circumstances of individuals and countries (Roberts, 2018, p. 273).

THE ARAB SPRING AND RECENT REVOLUTIONS IN AFRICA

In North Africa, the Arab Spring produced a caricature of revolutions. The examples of two countries, Egypt and Libya, are instructive of the personalisation of Africa's political struggles. In Egypt, while the young people desired fundamental change to militaristic oligarchy, Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood political group lost sight of the driving force of the revolution (Roberts, 2018). In the first place, various opposition groups representing a broad cross-section of Egyptian society, including secularists, feminists, Islamists, anti-capitalists, and many others, initiated the January 25 protests. Nevertheless, one of the early policies of the Morsi regime was to constrict the people's freedom, violating the core of feminist identity, including restricting the beauty regimen of Egyptian women. This was, on the whole, pathetic. Significantly, Nefertiti taught women of the world to value and beautify their bodies, not necessarily to entice men but to please themselves as women. To urge the modern Nefertiti's of Egypt to discard mascara and lips gloss or to mask their bodies compulsorily constitutes odious insularity taken too far. Thus, Morsi and the Muslim

Brotherhood in power represented a grave assault on the ancient heritage of the modern Egyptian women and egregious trampling on the freedom of the women generally.

In the second place, albeit individual Islamists were present during the early days of the protests, the Muslim Brotherhood did not sanction the first protests. Nevertheless, the positive outcome of the struggle enabled the Brotherhood to form legal, political parties for the first time in Egyptian history. However, under the watch of Morsi, the Coptic Church, an arrowhead of the protests with Coptic Christians protecting Muslim protesters at prayer following state attacks, suffered gratuitous setbacks. Churches were demolished in Upper Egypt, and the secularist solidarity unraveled, followed by attacks by state security forces, resulting in 28 deaths and hundreds of injuries (Oprescu, 2019).

In Libya, the misguided policy to end the era of Muammar Ghadafi degenerated to factional contestations. Currently, General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA) lays siege on the capital, having seized Bengazhi after three years of fighting. In February 2019, the LNA achieved victory in the Battle of Derna and then launched a major offensive in April 2019 in an attempt to seize Tripoli (The Economist, 2019). Thus far, General Haftar, upon the capture of Sirte, has defied all international persuasions and steadily leading his troops to overwhelm the internationally recognised government in Tripoli.

A fundamental lesson of the effect of the Arab Spring in North Africa has been aptly characterised as the synthesis "of globalisation's dialectic duality, in which economic integration has contributed to the demise of national authoritarianism, inciting communalism and political fragmentation" (Salamey, 2015, p. 111).

PERSONALISED STRUGGLE IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA

For instance, the Niger Delta of Nigeria's struggle had reflected a makeshift ideology that changes from resource control to self-determination.

Indeed, a quintessential example of 'personal' agenda of struggles, which thus criminalised the insurgents, was the case of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. The Presidential Adviser's elucidatory rationalisation on the Niger Delta and chair of the government's Amnesty Programme not only illustrates the bind in the argument but also Kingsley Kuku disclosed that the

immediate effort by the Federal Government and as part of the agreement to compel government's commitment and good faith in the agreement was that houses were going to be provided for the militant leaders, mobility was going to be provided for them, most especially economic lifeline so they don't return to the creeks and continue their agitation, an excuse of government's breach of commitment" (Kuku, 2013).

Perhaps, it is evident that the reason for the protracted nature of the African struggles – many have continued for over 10 years – and the extent of damage both to humans and infrastructure is because of the lack of a straightforward communal ethos and fundamentally transformative focus. A good and popular rallying call has been absent and the lack of mass support as against sectional or ethnic support, guidance, and justification, which ideology provides for a struggle.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps, more than any other continent, Africa has witnessed several protracted struggles and conflicts fought on her soil and devastating effects in human, material, and development. While several reasons may be adduced for these conflicts, a disturbing fact that has emerged is that many lack a clear ideological basis. This lack had made many of the struggles, no matter how notable, most often either mindless or unjustifiable. Those who seek to overthrow a government or express a grievance through armed struggle will inevitably need guidance, support, and justification, which an ideology offers, especially a post-revolutionary explanation in the form that will garner support revolutionaries. Revolution spawns ide-

ology and utilises its justificatory power no matter whether such ideology is makeshift and pragmatic. The litmus test of any ideology, whether Marxian or nationalist, is whether it succeeds or not. In fact, it will facilitate the building of necessary support for the insurgents and the struggle. In all, the lack of ideological underpinning makes most of the struggle in Africa and Asia' personal' instead of being 'universalistic' struggles.

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